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Abstract: We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model of housing, incorporating some
key features that bridge time and space. We model explicitly the evolution of housing struc-
tures/household durables and the separate role played by land, fully accounting for households’
locational choice decisions. Housing services derive positive utility, but are decayed away from the
city center. Our model enables a full characterization of the dynamic paths of housing as well as
housing and land prices. The model is particularly designed to be calibrated to fit some important
stylized facts, including faster growth of housing structure/household durables than housing, faster
growth of land prices than housing prices, a locationally steeper land rent gradient than the housing
price gradient, and relatively flatter housing quantity and price gradients in larger cities with flat-
ter population gradients. The calibrated model is then used to quantitatively assess the dynamic
and spatial consequences of demand and supply shifts. We find that nonhomotheticity in forms
of income-elastic spending on housing/household durables and minimum structure requirement in
housing production are essential ingredients.
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1 Introduction
The housing sector is very significant in size. While the value of the American housing stock accounts
for more than 30% of national wealth, the housing-related expenditure is about one-fourth of the
total household spending. Moreover, housing activity can generate large macroeconomic eﬀects, for
example, Case, Quigley and Shiller (2005) find rather large eﬀects of housing wealth on household
consumption using a panel of 14 developed countries over the period of 1975-1999 and a panel of
U.S. states over the period of 1982-1999. Yet, not until the turn of the century, the housing sector
has largely been ignored by macroeconomists.1 Even in this limited literature, to be reviewed below,
the model of housing lacks some key features. Rather, housing is often simply modelled as a type
of capital or a form of durable goods. Because a house is tied to a plot of land at a specific location
usually close to the occupant’s workplace, it is locationally immobile and the consumption set of
housing is nonconvex.2
In this paper, we intend to model housing with care, particularly in some aspects that bridge time
and space. In a recent insightful study, Davis and Heathcote (2007) find that properly decomposing
a house into housing structure and land enables better understanding of the time series movements
and cross location variation in housing prices. We go one step further: by constructing a dynamic
general equilibrium model of housing, we are able to model explicitly the evolution of housing
structures and the separate role played by land and to take explicitly the households’ locational
choice decisions into account. Some crucial ingredients are incorporated into our basic framework
so as to capture a minimum set of four stylized facts, both over time and across locations, based on
the U.S. observations:
• Measured by housing structures plus household durables, the housing durable out-grows hous-
ing.
• Housing prices grow at much lower rates than land rents.
• By putting aside urban ghettos, both housing price and land rent gradients are downward-
sloping away from urban centers (or subcenters), though the land rent gradient is much steeper.
• In larger MSAs with flatter population gradients, both housing quantity and price gradients
are flatter.
1See Leung (2004) for a critical survey, documenting clearly such an ignorance in the literature.
2While a house in San Francisco and a house in New York are both in the consumption set, a convex combination
of a fraction of a house in San Francisco and a fraction of a house in New York is not.
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We believe that this model, specifically calibrated to fit all these facts, would serve as a good basis
for future research on related issues where housing is an integral part of the analysis.
Specifically, we construct a two-sector optimal growth model with a composite final good sec-
tor and a housing sector. The composite final good can be used for consumption or for capital
investment. In addition to composite good consumption, housing services also enters the utility
function, with two special features. First, we allow housing to have a diﬀerent income elasticity,
dictated by a nonhomothetic preference, than the composite good consumption, and let the data
spell out the diﬀerence. Second, we allow housing services to be decayed away from the city center
to capture spatial discounting as observed in the market. On the supply side, housing is produced
by land and housing structures/durables. Similarly, we also allow housing production function to
be nonhomothetic, capturing the possibility that there might be a minimum structure required for
a house, which is yet again to be determined by calibration.
Both housing structures/durables and the composite good are produced with the use of physical
capital. In equilibrium, both goods and land market clear (no vacant land) and no household has
incentive to relocate (locational no-arbitrage). We begin by solving the social planner’s problem in
a tractable manner and then decentralize it by finding supporting prices with location-dependent
redistributions (housing taxes/subsidies and redistribution of nonhousing wealth). Upon obtaining
the steady-state competitive spatial equilibrium, we derive a basket of analytical comparative statics
and then calibrate the theoretical model to fit the average U.S. data over 1960-2000 to further
quantify our analysis.
The main analytic findings of our paper are summarized as follows. First, an increase in the
housing production technology or in the supply of land raises housing quantity but reduces the
relative price of housing. Second, if housing is more luxury than the composite consumption good,
which is shown to be the case by calibration, an increase in the consumption good production
technology lowers the cost of producing the consumption good and enables reallocation of resources
to housing production, thus raising both the quantity and the relative price of housing.
The model, calibrated to fit the four stylized facts, can also deliver additional results that are
consistent with other observations. First, a set of comparative statics regarding the housing related
quantities and prices fit the observed spatial patterns. For example, housing exhibits much higher
cross-location variations than consumption and housing durable schedules; and, a larger MSA with a
flatter population gradient is found to have the quantity of housing rising less rapidly away from the
CBD and housing and land prices declining less rapidly away from the CBD. Second, along a dynamic
path with accumulation of capital and housing durables, the prices of housing durables exhibit a
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slight downward trend over time, corroborating with findings in the home production literature.
Moreover, the housing expenditure ratio exhibits a moderate increase initially and remains largely
unchanged afterward, which is again consistent with empirical findings. Finally, as a by-product
of our numerical exercises, the computed wealth share of housing, including household durables, is
viewed reasonable as well.
An important take-away message of this paper is that the nonhomothetic specifications in the
preferences and in the housing production are both essential. With homothetic preferences, our
robustness analysis finds spatial distributions of various housing related quantities and prices to
be inconsistent with the observations. Similarly, with homothetic housing production function, the
responses to demand and supply shifts turn out to be quantitatively too large to be reasonable.
Related Literature
There are two streams of conventional research: one is the durable housing literature in regional
science and urban economics and another is the microfinance literature. Because these studies do
not focus on macroeconomic issues, we would not discuss the details but simply refer the reader to
the survey by Leung (2004).
More recently, there is a small but growing literature of housing that is macro-based. Kan,
Kwong and Leung (2004) study the upward trend of residential and commercial property prices and
the relative volatility. Davis and Heathcote (2005) examine the movements in housing construction
and other related macro aggregates over the business cycle. Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2006) model
the trade-up of houses over a household’s life cycle facing borrowing constraints. Bajari, Chan,
Krueger and Miller (2008) and Flavin and Nakagawa (2008) study housing demand and asset port-
folio in a world with income or asset return uncertainty. While Davis and Martin (2008) investigate
whether the home production model of housing can explain equity or value premium puzzles, Davis
and Ortalo-Magné (2008) examine cross-MSA variation in housing rentals and household wages.
In these papers, housing is introduced with its service entering the utility function either directly
(cf. Leung 2001; Kan, Kwong and Leung 2004; Davis and Heathcote 2005; Ortalo-Magné and Rady
2006; Bajari, Chan, Krueger and Miller 2008; Davis and Ortalo-Magné 2008; Flavin and Nakagawa
2008) or indirectly via a consumption aggregator and home production (cf. Davis and Martin 2008).
In most studies, housing is produced by capital or labor or a combination of the two. The only
exceptions are Leung (2001) and Davis and Heathcote (2005) in which land is considered as an
input of new house production.
To see how our paper is situated in the existing literature, we note that none of these afore-
mentioned models incorporates the location-specific feature of land and housing structures, thereby
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ignoring endogenous locational choice.3 To account for the key stylized facts regarding spatial
distributions, nonhomotheticity, articulated as above, is a key ingredient. In addition, our paper
provides a characterization of the dynamic paths of housing as well as housing and land prices,
which is largely unexplored in previous studies.
2 The Model
Let the city (or MSA) be situated in a segment of real line, [−1 1], with location 0 representing the
central business district (CBD). Let the land supply be distributed along the real line according
to an exogenous density function ¯ (), for  ∈ [−1 1], where  indexes a location. We assume
¯ 0()  0 to capture the fact that land is more abundant away from the city center. Moreover, we
assume that the land supply at  = 0 is positive (¯ (0)  0).
For convenience, the population of agents is assumed constant over time with mass two. Further
assume that each agent supplies labor inelastically at 12 . Thus, the aggregate labor supply in the
economy is one. We will focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which locational choice yields a
negative exponential distribution of households over [−1 1]. More specifically,
() = 
−||
1− − 
which is widely supported by empirical evidence (see the original work by Clark 1951 and a com-
prehensive survey by McDonald 1989). By changing , we can analyze various city-economies such
as Chicago, New York and Philadelphia.
Our spatial economy has two theaters of production activities: one produces a composite final
good and another accumulates housing durables. Production of both of these mobile goods take
place at the CBD to which workers commute.
2.1 The Housing Sector
Housing of a representative household at location  is specified as:
 =   ( − )1− (1)
3Berliant, Peng and Wang (2002), Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002), Xie (2008) and Lin, Mai and Wang (2004)
allow for endogenous locational choice. However, the first three papers are static, whereas the last paper only considers
a unified household capital without separating residential and nonresidential uses. Moreover, all of these studies focus
on the issues of urban land use and internal structure of cities, which are very diﬀerent from ours.
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where  is the use of land,  is the housing structure and household durable component of the
house, and  is introduced to allow for the possibility that a minimum structure might be needed for
producing reasonable quantitative results.4 The Cobb-Douglas form ensures that land and housing
structures/durables are Pareto complement in the sense that an increase in one input raises the
marginal product of another. In equilibrium, land demand equals supply at each location ,
() = ¯ ()
The output of housing durable investment at location  is produced with the use of physical
capital:
 = 
where ˙ = () with ()  0 0  0 and lim→∞() = 0 for any . Abstracting the labor input
from the production of housing durable investment is innocuous, as housing durable investment is
more capital intensive relative to the composite final good. Although one may easily allow labor to
enter this production process while maintaining the factor intensity ranking, labor allocation across
locations  ∈ [−1 1] would lead to unnecessary complication in the analysis.
The stock of housing durables evolves according to,
˙ =  −  =  −  (2)
where   0 denotes the demolishment rate of housing structure/household durables and (0) =
 ≥  for any .
2.2 The Composite Final Good Sector
The composite final goods sector features the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
 =  1− (3)
where labor, , is inelastically supplied at one and  is a constant
Denote   0 as the capital depreciation rate. The output of the composite final goods can
then be used for consumption ( for those residing in ) or capital investment (˙+), implying:
˙ =  1− −
Z 1
−1
() −  (4)
which governs the evolution of capital over time.
4Alternatively, we could specify  = ( + )1−  with   0, to achieve the same purpose, but this is much
less intuitive.
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The total stock of capital, , can be allocated as follows:
 =  + =  +
Z 1
−1
() (5)
where  is equally owned by all the agents and  is the aggregate capital stock allocated to the
housing sector.
2.3 Preferences
The lifetime utility function of an individual residing at location  is specified as:
 =
Z ∞
0
( ())− (6)
where   0 is the subjective rate of time preference and () is a spatial discounting function
capturing the idea that the further away the house is from the CBD, the lower the utility one derives
from the house. Part of the reduction in utility may be thought of capturing the detrimental eﬀect
from commuting. With spatial discounting, it is not necessary to consider a separate resource cost
of commuting, which we assume. Without loss of generality, we normalize (0) = 1.
The point-in-time utility function takes the following form:
( ()) =  (() + )1− ,  ∈ (0 1) (7)
where nonhomotheticity is introduced via parameter  to allow for a diﬀerent income elasticity
of housing than the composite consumption good. If  is positive, which is to be confirmed by
calibration, housing is said to be more luxurious in the subsequent discussion than the composite
good. Moreover, the Cobb-Douglas form ensures that composite good consumption and housing
service (()) are Pareto complement.5
2.4 Locational Choice
Given the ex ante symmetry between all agents, it has to be the case that in equilibrium, ( ())
is independent of . In other words, the following locational no-arbitrage condition holds:
( ()) = (00) (8)
Thus, in equilibrium, individual agents feel indiﬀerent in residing in any location.
5An alternative to allow housing services to be unnecessary is to use the constant elasticity of substitution form
with the elasticity less than one. However, this implies that composite good consumption and housing are Pareto
substitutes, which is unrealistic.
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3 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we solve the optimization problem and then derive the steady-state equilibrium.
We begin by solving the central planner’s problem instead of solving the competitive equilibrium
directly. We then identify a necessary redistribution scheme to support the decentralization of the
optimal allocation obtained from the central planner’s problem.
3.1 Optimization
For convenience, we define:
Ψ (0) ≡ 

0 (0 − )1− + 
()  ( − )1− + 
which is increasing in 0 but decreasing in , satisfying Ψ0 (00) = 1. We can then simplify the
central planner’s problem by utilizing (7) and (8) to express the locational no-arbitrage condition
in forms of final good consumption:
 = 0Ψ (0) 1− (9)
That is, Ψ governs relative composite good consumption across locations.
Using (9), we can write the central planner’s problem as:
max
Z ∞
0
0
³
 0 (0 − )1− + 
´1− −
subject to
˙ = 
µ
 −
Z 1
−1
()
¶
1− −
Z 1
−1
0Ψ (0) 1− () −  (10)
˙ =  −  for all  (11)
This optimization problem can be solved by setting the current-value Hamiltonian,
H = max0 

0
³
 0 (0 − )1− + 
´1−
+
∙

µ
 −
Z 1
−1
()
¶
1− −
Z 1
−1
0Ψ (0) 1− () − 
¸
+
Z 1
−1

h
 − 
i

where  and  are co-state variables.
We next define:
Γ =
Z 1
−1
Ψ (0) 1− () (12)
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which is indeed the endogenous social welfare weight on those residing at location 0.6 The first-order
conditions with respect to 0 and  are:
−10
³
 0 (0 − )1− + 
´1−
= Γ (13)
−1 = 
µ
 −
Z 1
−1
()
¶−1
1−() (14)
While (13) equates the marginal benefit from raising location-0 resident’s consumption and the
marginal cost from reducing others’ consumption, (14) equates the value of marginal product of
capital between the two sectors. From (14), we have:
 =
µ(0)
0()
¶1(1−)
0 (15)
That is, the ratio of capital allocated to the housing sector between two locations depends positively
on the ratio of the shadow value of housing durables. When the shadow value of housing durables
is relatively high at a particular location, it encourages more housing durable investment at that
location, thus creating more induced demand for capital input into the production of housing durable
investment.
The Euler equations with respect to  and  are given by,
˙ = (+ )− 
µ
 −
Z 1
−1
()
¶−1
1−
˙ = (+ ) − 
∙
(1− ) 1−  0Π ()Ψ (0)
1−
 ()
¸
where Π () ≡ 1− ()
 (−)1−
() (−)1−+ is decreasing in . By rewriting these above expressions
using the first-order conditions, (13) and (14), we obtain:
˙
 = (+ )− 
µ
 −
Z 1
−1
()
¶−1
1− (16)
˙
 = (+ )−
−1

³
 − R 1−1()´−1 1− (1− )
1− 
 0Π ()Ψ (0)
1−
 (17)
The above two expressions govern the shadow price of capital and housing durables, respectively.
6This can be easily verified by maximizing the social welfare function given by
 1
−1Ω( ()), subject to
(2) and (4). Applying Negishi (1960), we can compute the social welfare weights consistent with the decentralized
equilibrium allocation, yielding: Ω0 = Γ.
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3.2 Decentralization
We are now ready to find competitive support to the central planner’s solution under an appropriate
redistribution scheme.
The relative price of housing can be defined as  =  . lead to an intertemporal no-arbitrage
condition:
˙
 = 
µ
 −
Z 1
−1
()
¶−1
1− −
⎡
⎢⎣
−1 (1− ) 1− 0Π ()Ψ (0)
1−


³
 − R 1−1()´−1 1− − 
⎤
⎥⎦
(18)
That is, if the net return on capital (first term on the right hand side) exceeds the net return on
housing durables, then there must be a capital gain associated with housing durables ( ˙  0) in
order for both sectors to remain operative (see Bond, Wang and Yip 1996). Moreover, since Π ()
and Ψ (0) are both decreasing in , it is clear that the rate of capital gain associated with
housing durables at a particular location rises with the stock of housing durables but falls with the
stock of capital at that location.
From our model, the rental price housing must be equal to the marginal rate of substitution
between housing and the composite good,
 = 1− 
()
() + 
We can then define the price of housing as:
 =  =
1

1− 

()
() +  (19)
That is, housing price is the capitalization of housing rental. From the specification of housing, the
rental price of housing durables is simply its value marginal product given by,
 = (1− ) − 
which yields a useful relationship governing the prices of housing durables and housing,
 = (1− )  − 
The land rent can then be defined based on the bid rent concept,
 =  −
That is, the land rent is the unit surplus of housing rental in excess of housing durable cost.
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We claim that these are location-specific supporting prices to the allocation derived from the
central planner problem under an appropriate redistribution scheme. Specifically, consider a distrib-
ution of the ownership, , of capital stock, , together with a housing tax   (subsidy if negative).
Let  denote the wage rate and  denote the capital rental rate, which equal the respective marginal
products:  = (1− ) and  = −1 . Each agent’s wealth is measured by,
Ω =  + 
which is the sum of the value of capital and the value of housing per individual. The individual
wealth evolves according to,
Ω˙ = 1
2
 + ( − ) −  −  −  
which is equal to wage income (recall that individual labor supply is 12) plus net capital income
subtracting consumption expenditure, capital user cost paid for producing housing durable invest-
ment and housing tax payment. To satisfy locational no-arbitrage, it must be that Ω = Ω0 and
Ω˙ = Ω˙0 for all . Using these together with the two redistribution constraints, R 1−1   = 0
and
R 1
−1 () = 1, we can then solve the redistribution pair (  ) for each location . This
verifies our claim.
3.3 Steady-State Equilibrium
From (16), (12), as well as (10) and (11), we obtain the following three steady-state relationships:
 =  −
Z 1
−1
() =
µ 
+ 
¶ 1
1−
(20)
 =
µ

¶ 1
(21)
 =
µ 
+ 
¶ 1
1−
+
Z 1
−1
µ

¶ 1 () (22)
0 =

³ 
+
´ 
1− − 
∙³ 
+
´ 1
1−
+
R 1
−1
¡  ¢ 1 ()¸R 1
−1Ψ (0)
1−
 ()
(23)
Clearly, a higher composite good technology or a lower time preference rate raises consumption
as well as capital allocated to the composite good sector. Moreover, a higher demolishment rate
requires more capital to be allocated to the housing sector to maintain the need for housing services.
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The above equations can then be combined with (17) to yield,

+ 
µ

¶−1 ∙
(1− ) 1−  0Π ()Ψ (0)
1−

¸
= +  (24)
Notice that, at  = 0, (24) reduces to an expression for solving uniquely 0(0) which turns out
to be an increasing function. This can then be substituted into (24) to derive all housing durables
(0), which are all increasing in 0 as well. Next, substituting (0) into (23) yields a fixed
point mapping in 0. Once the fixed point of 0 is obtained, it can then be plugged into (0) to
solve for  for all , and then into (21), (22) and (9) to solve for ,  and . Using (1) and (3),
we obtain the steady-state value of housing and the composite good output,  and  . Finally, we
can solve all the supporting prices. In particular, the steady-state capital rental rate is:  = + .
One may also compute the price of housing durables as:
 =  =
+ 
−1
It can then be verified that in the steady state the housing durable price satisfies  = (+ ) .
Recall that the housing price satisfies  =  . Thus, the capitalization of housing durables and
housing diﬀers by the demolishment factor . Since both  and  are constant over time and across
locations, we can examine the dynamic and spatial patterns of housing and housing durable prices
by using their corresponding rental price measures ( and ), which are in comparable units
to the land rent.
It may be noted that the involvement of 0 in all the location-specific variables makes the
steady-state equilibrium too complicated to be characterized analytically. In particular, all the
preference and technology parameters of interest, (     ), will aﬀect the fixed point of
0 ambiguously due to their opposing eﬀects on Ψ (0) via 0(0) and (0). Thus, we
will instead perform comparative-static exercises only under the baseline one-location setup, while
conducting the equilibrium characterization of the general model only numerically.
3.4 Characterization of the Steady-State Equilibrium
In order to perform comparative statics in the baseline one-location case, we utilize the “hat cal-
culus” that has been frequently adopted by general equilibrium trade theorists. Denoting ˆ = ˙ ,
we can totally diﬀerentiate the key relationships in the baseline one-location setup and manipulate
the expressions to derive the fundamental equation governing the changes in the housing quantity
in response to changes model parameters (     ):
ˆ = ˆ+ ˆ + ˆ + ˆ +  ˆ + ˆ (25)
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where the elasticities ,  =      , can be found in Appendix A. Similarly, we can then
obtain the fundamental equation governing the changes in the housing price in response to changes
in (     ):
ˆ = ˆ+ ˆ + ˆ + ˆ +  ˆ + ˆ (26)
where the elasticities ,  =      , are also reported in Appendix A.
Based on these two fundamental equations, we can summarize the comparative static results in
the following table:
     
Housing Quantity () + + − − − +
Housing Price () + −∗ − ? +∗ −
Note: ∗ if  small
Among these six parameters, , , and  can be characterized as aﬀecting the supply side,  the
demand side,  both the demand and supply side (to be elaborated below), and  the intertemporal
choice.
Intuitively, an increase in the housing production technology () lowers the cost of producing
housing, thus raising housing quantity but reducing housing price. The responses of housing quantity
and price to an increase in the supply of land are similar. We next examine what happens to an
increase in the minimum structure requirement for housing (higher ). Since such a requirement
raises the cost of producing a house, housing price rises while housing supply decreases in response.
In response to an increase in the luxury good nature of housing relative to the consumption good
(higher ), individual preferences shift away from housing and as a result both housing quantity
and housing price are lower. Notably, while an increase in  or  or a decrease in  capture a
prototypical outward shift in housing supply, a decrease in  indicate a prototypical outward shift
in housing demand.
Turning now to time discounting (), we can see that more impatience discourages allocation of
resources for the future. Since housing requires continual inflows to maintain its adequate service,
it falls in response to an increase in time discounting. While such a reduction in housing production
tends to raise housing price, the resulting increase in the real interest rate tends to lower housing
price. The net eﬀect of impatience on housing price is therefore ambiguous. Notice that in partial
equilibrium setups adopted by conventional housing models, rising time discounting would reduce
housing price unambiguously.
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Finally, an increase in the consumption good production technology (), in addition to a positive
wealth eﬀect (demand eﬀect), lowers the cost of producing the consumption good and increases the
relative price of housing. As a consequence, it enables reallocation of resources to housing production
and raises the quantity of housing (supply eﬀect). Such an eﬀect only arises in multi-sectoral setups
within the general equilibrium framework.
It is noted that equations (25) and (26) are useful not only for deriving comparative statics but
also for numerically decomposing changes in the quantity and the price of housing once we have
calibrated the model economy, to which we now turn.
4 Quantitative Analysis
We now calibrate the model to fit with the average U.S. data over 1960-2000. We then use the
calibrated model to perform various numerical analyses. Additionally, we check the robustness of
our main quantitative findings using a gammaville.
4.1 Calibration
Under our theoretical framework, the total population is two. Denote  as the per capita flow
of non-housing related consumption good,  as the per capita stock of housing structure plus
household durables (called housing durable),  as the per capita output of the housing durables
sector and  as housing per capita (all without the location subscript ). We specify the land
supply as a simple quadratic function: ¯ () = (+  ||)2, where  measures the land supply at the
CBD and   0 reflects increasing land supply away from the CBD. We further specify the spatial
discounting function in a linear form given by: () = 1 −  ||, where  measures the locational
discount rate. We normalize  = 1 so that the amount of land at the CBD is ¯ (0) = 1. We then
select  = 03 and  = 01, under which those at city border discount housing consumption by 30%
compared to a resident at the CBD and land supply at city border is 21% more than at the CBD. In
computing aggregate variables, the per capita land supply is set as:  = R 10 (1 + 01)2 = 11033.
In the benchmark case, we use Chicago configuration where the negative exponential distribution
parameter is given by  = 03 using the estimate in McDonald (1989).
In the macroeconomics literature, the time preference rate is taken to be between 2% and 5%;
we thus set  = 0035. Also in compliance with the literature, we choose the capital income
share as one-third (implying  = 13). We set the rate of capital depreciation,  = 5%, a
number widely used in the literature. The overall depreciation of housing structure and household
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durables considered herein includes both demolishment of housing structure and depreciation of
household durables. While Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991) uses 78% as the depreciation rate
for the household structures and equipment, Davis and Heathcote (2005) computes the housing
demolishment rate as 157%. It is reasonable to assume that the latter accounts for 75% of the
overall depreciation, which yields  = 00313.
The calibration analysis is conducted using a simpler version of the model in which there is one
location, namely all households are situated in location  = 0. By choosing units, we normalize
one of the two technological scaling factors by setting  = 1. Let  =  measure the housing
durable flow to non-housing consumption ratio. The capital share of housing sector is denoted
by  . Further denote the capital-output ratio in the housing durable sector as  = (2),
where 2 measures the aggregate output of housing durables. In the steady state,  = , which
implies:  = 2. In the home production literature (e.g. Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright
1991; Greenwood and Hercowitz 1991), the housing consumption flow is regarded as large as non-
housing consumption; our  is only part of the housing consumption flow, we thus set  = 05.
Since the economy-wide capital-output ratio in the U.S. usually falls in the range from 2 to 3, we
set  = 225 as the benchmark. Based on our steady-steady relationships, we can then obtain:
 =
µ 
+ 
¶ 1
1−
= 77659
 = 1
2
 −  = 
 − 
2
³
1 + 
´ = 07579
Subsequently, the capital stock devoted to the housing durable sector, the housing capital share and
the steady-state value of housing durables can be computed as:
 = 2 = 15250
 =  + = 01641
 =  = 108268
That is, about 165% of the aggregate capital stock is allocated to producing housing durables.
According to Davis and Ortalo-Magné (2008), the expenditure share of housing is about 24%
( = 024). Over the four decades between 1960 and 2000, we can use the data provided by Davis
and Heathcote (2007) to compute housing growth rate at 18% ( = 0018), the housing structure
growth rate at 24% ( = 0024), the housing structure price growth rate at 068% ( = 00068)
and the land price growth rate at 433% ( = 00433). Moreover, the average land value to
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housing value share is about 36% ( = 036). Using non-durable consumption as a proxy, we
compute the non-housing consumption good growth rate as 3% ( = 003).
These ratios and growth rates can then be used to calibrate some key parameters in our model.
Recall that, from our model,  = 1− + ,  = (1−)− and  = − . Assuming
fixed land supply over time, we totally diﬀerentiate the above three price relationships around the
steady state to obtain:
ˆ = ˆ + ˆ −  − ˆ (27)
ˆ = ˆ−  +  ˆ (28)
ˆ =  −
³
ˆ + ˆ
´
−  −
³
ˆ + ˆ
´
Denote the land value to housing value share as:  =  . Straightforward manipulations lead
to,
ˆ =
³
ˆ + ˆ
´
+
(1− ) − −
1− (1− ) −
ˆ (29)
 =  = 1− (1− )

 −  (30)
Let the rates of changes of all price and quantity variables capture their respective transitional
growth rates, (         ).7 From (27) and (28), we have:

 = 1−

 +  −  (31)
 =

 −  − 1 (32)
We utilize (30) to write (1− ) − = 1−  , which, together with (29) and (31), gives:
 =   + (1−  ) ( + )−  = 00173
We can now use (30) and (31) to compute:
 =
µ
1−  +  − 
¶
 = 17095
 = 1− 1− 
−
= 04611
7These transitional changes are consequences of transitional changes in (). We do not model these changes as
permanent because we must otherwise construct specific unbalanced endogenous growth models which often require
adding a third sector with two of the three sectors growing at diﬀerent rates but balancing each other in aggregation
(see Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie 2001, Bond, Trask and Wang 2003 and Acemoglu and Guerrieri 2008). Adding such
a sector would make the analysis more diﬃcult without generating further insight over our simple optimal growth
structure.
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Thus, the minimum structure requirement for housing is indeed present in the data, which is about
one-sixth of the amount of housing durables. Applying the functional form of housing given by
 =   ( − )1− = 34436 and the land supply schedule, we can then utilize (32) to calibrate:
 =
µ 
 −  − 1
¶
 = 14371
which confirms that housing is indeed more luxurious than the composite good.
Finally, from the first-order condition governing consumption and housing demand, we have:
 = + =
1
1 + 1−
+

which yields,
 =
³
1
 − 1
´ 
+
1 +
³
1 − 1
´ + = 06908
Furthermore, from the steady-state relationship (2) = , we can write:
 = 
(2)
Substituting this expression into another steady-state relationship,

+ 
µ

¶−1
(1− ) 1−  
1
 − 

 +  = + ,
leads to a single equation in . This gives the calibrated value  = 08963, which can be plugged
back into the previous expression to calibrate  = 04321.
4.2 Numerical Results
We begin by identifying the redistribution scheme (  ) that is required for equilibrium support.
In our benchmark case, such a scheme features imposing taxes on those in inner city [−0517 0517]
and providing subsidies to those in outskirts [−1−0517]∪[0517 1]. The redistributive tax/subsidy
schedules over the right half of the city, [0 1], are plotted in Figure 1 (dashed line). Intuitively,
the consideration of locational discounting  () can be thought of regarding the CBD as a public
good whose services decay with distance. Thus, one would expect that those enjoying more of such
public good services (in the inner city) would be taxed. Similarly, those who reside in inner city
[−0563 0563] would be allocated a share of capital stock lower than average whereas those who
in ourskirts [−1−0563] ∪ [0563 1] a share of capital stock higher than average (solid line). More
specifically, the tax rate at the center is 017% and the subsidy at the fringe is 027%. Those at
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the center holds 4987% of capital stock per capita and those at the fringe holds 5028% of capital
stock per capita; all very close to the average of 50%. As a by-product of this decentralization
exercise, we can compute the wealth share of housing as 5833%. Based on the 2000 Census, such a
share without including household durables is 323%. Since our calculation includes the household
durables, it is viewed as reasonably consistent with the data.
Using calibrated parameter values, we can further compute 3 quantity and 3 price ratios across
locations in the city, plus 3 aggregate shares/ratios, the housing expenditure share (), the housing
capital share () and the ratio of aggregate housing durables to housing (). The results are
reported below:
10
10
10
10
10
10  


10402 12503 09956 07952 06077 09995 024 01641 31441
Thus, the quantity of housing at the city fringe is about 25% more than at the CBD (the amount
of land is by construction 21% more). While the land rent is about 39% lower, the housing price
is only about 20% less at the border compared to the center. In Figure 2, we plot the schedule
of each endogenous quantity or price over the right half of the city, [0 1]. As one can see clearly,
while housing schedule shows significant cross-location variations, consumption and housing durable
schedules are rather flat. Moreover, the land rent schedule is much steeper than the housing rental
price schedule, whereas the housing durable rental price schedule is essentially flat. Intuitively, land
is entirely immobile while housing durables are fully mobile. It is expected that the greater the
degree of mobility is, the less the cross-location variation will be, thereby explaining our results.
We can also compute the housing quantity and price elasticities with respect to various parameter
changes, reported in the table below:
     
Housing Quantity () 06213 06405 −01536 −04654 −00188 05319
Housing Price () 06439 −04520 −01592 −05426 −00012 −03877
This table coincides well with our theoretical predictions in Section 3 except the housing price
elasticity of , the parameter of minimum housing structure. This is because with our calibrated
, an increase in  raises the need for housing structure , which in turn raises the demand for
, and reduces consumption (higher  implies a more significant reduction), with the tendency
of lowering housing price:  = (1− )(( + ))
We next turn to conducting comparative-static exercises quantitatively. We are particularly
interested in the responses of the above cross-location ratios and the three aggregate shares/ratios
17
to a 10% increase in each of four key preference and technology parameters, , ,  and . Such
responses in percentage are reported as follows.
% 10
10
10
10
10
10  


 −008 −026 −039 −026 −067 −005 −306 −267 −102
 000 −001 000 000 −003 000 −004 133 157
 131 −018 −027 −018 −044 −003 −057 −051 −019
 005 013 020 014 036 002 157 019 357
Thus, when housing becomes more luxurious (higher ), the out-skirt to inner city ratios of
consumption, the quantity of housing and housing durables, and the rental prices of land, housing
and housing durables are all lower. Intuitively, when housing becomes less necessary, housing
demand must fall. In terms of the production of housing, the derived demand for housing durables
will also fall, though normally by not as much.8 Our quantitative results suggest that while housing
expenditure and housing capital shares fall sharply, the ratio of aggregate housing durables to
housing falls. Among all the cross-location ratios, housing, housing durables, housing rental prices
and land rents are more responsive.
An increase in the minimum housing structure requirement (higher ) has little influence on
any of the cross-location ratios (with many of such changes less than 0005%). In response to
this increased minimum requirement, it is necessary to allocate more capital to housing capital to
produce the required housing durables (i.e., the housing capital share must increase). As a result,
both housing durable prices and housing prices rise, while the land rent falls. The former changes
discourage housing demand, thereby lowering the housing expenditure share and raising the housing
durables to housing ratio. Our quantitative results suggest that while the housing expenditure share
drops negligibly, both the housing capital share and the aggregate housing durables to housing ratio
rise sharply.
Except for the eﬀect on the cross-location consumption ratio, the change in spatial discounting
generates qualitatively identical eﬀects to the change in the luxury good nature of housing. Intu-
itively, in response to higher spatial discounting (higher  in the spatial discounting function,  ()),
agents are less willing to reside at outskirts, thereby reducing housing demand and housing durables
demand as well as their prices and the land rent in the outer city. That is, both the ratios of housing
and housing durables at the fringe to the center must fall. Our quantitative results suggest that
8 In trade theory, the finding that changes in output are larger than changes in inputs is usually referred to as the
magnification eﬀect in quantity.
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the economy-wide housing durables to housing ratio decreases marginally. It is interesting to note
that almost all the cross-location ratios (except housing durable prices) are most responsive to this
spatial discounting perturbation.
Concerning an increase in the housing durable technology (higher ), all the responses are
exactly reverse to an increase in the luxury good nature of housing. Such reversed eﬀects are not
surprising as one may view the luxury good nature of housing as a barrier to housing development,
thereby having opposite impact to the productivity of housing durables. Because housing durable
productivity has a direct positive impact on housing durables, it tends to increase the aggregate
housing durables to housing ratio. Our quantitative results show a sharp rise in both the housing
expenditure share and the aggregate housing durables to housing ratio in response to an increase
in the housing durable technology.
It is noted that in response to any of these parameter changes, land rents are always much more
responsive than other rental prices, while housing is relatively less responsive than housing durables.
Finally, we shift our attention to city configurations. Based on the estimates provided by Mc-
Donald (1989), we have used the case of Chicago as the benchmark where the negative exponential
distribution parameter is  = 03. We now consider two alternative configurations: New York
with a flatter population gradient ( = 02) and Philadelphia with a steeper population gradient
( = 04). For comparison purposes, we normalize both cases with population equal to two and
landscape over the same unit interval [−1 1]. The results of the key gradients are reported below
and illustrated in Figure 3:
 10 10 10
10
10
10
02 10548 11927 09940 08318 06698 09993
04 10258 13106 09972 07602 05514 09997
While both the quantities and prices of mobile goods do not alter much, those of immobile goods
vary substantially. In a larger MSA like New York where the population gradient is flatter compared
to a smaller MSA like Philadelphia, the housing quantity gradient as well as housing and land price
gradients are all flatter, with land prices much more responsive than housing prices.9 Thus, a larger
MSA with a flatter population gradient will have the quantity of housing rising less rapidly away
9Due to our normalization of population and city boundaries, the reader is advised not to pay attention to the
absolute level but the gradient of these variables depicted in Figure 3. Should New York be allowed to have 4
times as populated as Philadelphia and twice as big in areas, its population density would be uniformly higher than
Philadelphia.
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from the CBD and housing and land prices declining less rapidly away from the CBD, conforming
with real world observations.
5 Transitional Dynamics
We now turn to examining the property of housing related quantities and prices along a dynamic
equilibrium path, especially those highlighted in the introduction. Because migration dynamics and
the resulting changes in spatial distribution along the transition is beyond the scope of the present
paper, it is suﬃcient to focus on the aggregate measures. As such, we shall move to a simpler
version of the model in which there is one location, with all households residing in location  = 0.
Moreover, we can also aﬀord to assume away the variability of housing productivity by setting 
constant (() ≡ 0), as the variability is mainly needed in the calibration exercise above.
The dynamics can be captured by the following equations (see derivation in Appendix B):
˙ = ( −  ( )) − 2()−  (33)
˙ = (+ )−  ( −  ( ))−1 (34)
˙ =  ( ( )2) −  (35)
˙ = (+ )− (1− ) 1− 
2()
 − 
  ( − )1−
  ( − )1− +  (36)
where
() =
³
  ( − )1− + 
´µ2

¶1(−1)
and  =  ( ) solves
 = 2
µ 
2
¶ 1
1−
( −) 1−1−
While () is decreasing in  and increasing in ,  ( ) is decreasing in  and increasing
 and . The computation of the steady state values of , , , and  can also be found in
Appendix B.
Based on our calibrated economy, we can apply backward shooting method to this one-location
setup to examine the transitional dynamics. Our numerical computations suggest that as the tra-
jectory approaches the steady state, it oscillates in the space of (). The intuition for oscillation
can be illustrated using Figure 4 (a close-up near the steady state). Starting at point Q,  = ∗
but   ∗, hence it is intuitive that a large fraction of capital would be allocated to the goods
sector, implying   ∗. As a result, ˙  0 at point . Since at point Q, the wealth of the
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representative agent is below that at the steady state, we must have   ∗ and the consumption
is small enough to allow for capital accumulation, namely ˙  0 (see equation (33)). Hence, the
trajectory from point  is south-east. At point 0,  = ∗ but   ∗, hence it is intuitive that
a large fraction of capital would be allocated to durable structure production, namely,   ∗,
which implies that ˙  0 (see equation (35)). Although this means that  ∗ , but 0 remains
below ∗, making it possible for ˙ to remain positive.
Of our particular interest, we can identify a transition path along which both  and  increase
monotonically until they are close to the steady state (see Figure 5). Specifically, starting from
(00) = (32705 17317), both  and  increase toward the steady state. As they approach the
steady state (indicated by the big dot), an oscillation occurs as depicted in the three graphs in the
lower panel of Figure 5: (i)  overshoots and then starts to fall while  continues to rise, (ii) both
fall, and (iii)  then rises while  continues to fall. A repetition of such an oscillation continues
until the steady state is reached (the close-up figure is not shown as it has already been illustrated
in Figure 4). This path is mimicking the transition dynamics in an economy continuing to evolve
by accumulating more capital and housing durables.
In addition to capital and housing durables, it is crucial to understand the transitional dynamics
of the rental prices of housing, land and housing durables. One can clearly see from Figure 6 that
along the transition, land rents (solid line) grow much more sharply (from 0027 to 008) than
housing rental prices (long-dashed line, which rises initially from 0071 from 0076 and then falls
back to 007), whereas the rental price schedule of housing durables (short-dashed line) exhibits
slight decline over time (from 0022 to 0014). This latter finding is consistent with the home
production literature, where cheaper household durables enable house wives to substitute out their
time for participating in market activities.
Finally, we note that the presence of the luxury good nature of housing results in changes in
the housing expenditure ratio over time. In our calibrated economy, this ratio increases moderately
from 209% to 24% over the first 25 years and remain largely unchanged afterward (see Figure 7).
The moderate increase in the ratio is basically consistent with the evidence in the U.S. For example,
Rogers (1988) documents that the ratio increased by 27% in urban areas and by 19% in rural areas
from 1972/73 to 1985, whereas Davis and Martin (2008) finds that the ratio increased by 23% from
1975 to 1982 and then becomes relatively stable with a slight downward trend through 2007.
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6 Alternative Parametrization and Model Specification
In this section, we will perform sensitivity analysis with regard to some parameter selections that are
not entirely based on observations. We will also provide further discussion concerning particularly
some key ingredients of our model specification.
6.1 Alternative Parametrization
In our calibration analysis, two parameter selections are not entirely based on observations: one
is the ratio of housing durables to consumption (, set as 05) and another is the housing-sector
capital-output ratio (, set as 225). To check the robustness of our results, we change  up and
down by 10% from its benchmark value (05) and  from 2 to 25 (reasonable range used in the
literature when calibrating the model to fit the U.S. data). We find that our main results are robust
to all such changes. More specifically, both the dynamic patterns and the cross-locational patterns
of our key variables are essentially unchanged. As reported in Appendix C, the only noticeable
changes are the economy-wide capital share and housing durables to housing ratio in the steady
state. Such changes are expected. When the model is calibrated with a higher housing durables to
consumption ratio, both the housing capital share and the housing durable to housing ratio must
rise. When the model is calibrated with a higher housing-sector capital-output ratio, the housing
capital share must increase.
Our calibrated economy features increasing land supply away from the CBD where the relative
supply at the fringe is about 21%more than at the center. In reality, such relative land supplies vary
across diﬀerent MSAs. We thus perform sensitivity analysis with respect to the land expansion rate
away from the CBD ( in the land supply schedule,  ()), changing it to 025 and 035 (deviating
from its benchmark value of 030). We find that the dynamic patterns of our key variables are
largely unchanged. In response to a steeper land expansion rate, all of the aggregate variables
are essentially unchanged. Concerning the cross-locational patterns of our key variables, the most
noticeable changes are steeper housing schedule and flatter housing price and land rent gradients
away from the CBD (see Appendix C), which are not surprising given the increased supply of land
toward fringes.
6.2 Alternative Model Specifications
There are three key factors driving some of the main results in the paper. The obvious one is
the spatial structure captured by both spatial discounting and increasing land supply away from
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the CBD. These ensure reasonable housing ratios at the fringe relative to the center as well as a
reasonable downward land rent gradient.
In addition, there are two ingredients worth highlighting. One is the luxury good nature of hous-
ing relative to the composite good captured by   0; another is the minimum housing structure
requirement captured by   0. Although the calibration confirms the presence of the nonhomo-
theticity in these specifications, it is of interest to check how quantitatively important they are if
each of them is assumed away.
6.2.1 Housing Is Not More Luxurious than Consumption
We abandon the luxury good nature of housing relative to the composite good (i.e., set  = 0),
which does not aﬀect any of the calibrated parameters except  (whose recalibrated value becomes
076). The steady-state values of some key ratios are now recalculated below:
10
10
10
10
10
10  


10363 12760 10278 08122 06403 10032 024 01641 31509
The most significant changes are that both the housing durables ratios and the housing durable
price ratios at the fringe compared to at the center are now exceeding one. That is, agents residing
in outskirts demand for more housing durables at higher prices. In terms of the dynamics, the
non-housing consumption growth rate is now given by  = 173%, much lower than the observed
rate of 3%.
We also redo comparative statics, obtain the following results:
% 10
10
10
10
10
10  

 000 000 −005 −001 012 −001 000 128 151
 121 059 092 060 151 010 000 000 −001
 000 000 003 000 −011 000 000 −116 306
The most significant changes compared to the benchmark case are three folds. First, and perhaps
the most undesirable outcome, the responses of housing-related quantity and price variables to  all
have wrong signs. Specifically, greater spatial discounting away from the CBD should cause agents
to be less willing to reside at outskirts, thereby reducing housing demand and housing durables
demand as well as their prices and the land rent. With  = 0, agents turn out to be more willing to
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reside away from the CBD despite they have a stronger preference to be closer to the center.10 This
is because that, with  = 0, () becomes a common multiplier to both composite consumption
and housing. In this case, adjustments in consumption may dominate the required adjustments
in housing. leading to counter-intuitive results in the relative price of housing and the relative
demands for housing. Second, the relative technological changes in the housing sector now have
essentially no eﬀect on any of the key ratios except the allocation of capital, which is unlikely in
the real world. Indeed, the land rent gradient and the housing capital share respond negatively to
a positive technology change in the housing sector, apparently counter-intuitive. Finally, although
not reported in the table above, the housing expenditure share is entirely flat, not only over time
but across locations within the city. The latter result is inconsistent with the U.S. data, where
within the MSA variations are observed as documented by Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2008).
In summary, the consideration of the luxury good nature of housing is crucial for producing
sensible comparative statics, particularly with respect to changes in locational preferences. It is
also useful for obtaining a sharp upward trend in the land rent to housing durable price ratio
and for the housing-related variables at diﬀerent locations to respond diﬀerently to sector-specific
technological changes.
6.2.2 Housing Requires No Minimum Structure
If we recalibrate the model by removing the minimum housing structure requirement (i.e., set  = 0),
three calibrated parameters would change:  = 036,  = 1347 and  = 04526. The steady-state
values of some key ratios become:
10
10
10
10
10
10  


10676 10999 08806 07889 05312 09854 024 01641 22753
Most significant changes are the large drops in the housing and housing durables ratios as well as the
land rent gradient and the housing capital share. Although there is no obvious problem associated
with any of these changes, we shall point out the calibrated value of the preference bias parameter
 appears unusually large relative to housing services (): the ratio () ranges from 34 to
44 (much larger than the benchmark counterparts, 048 to 055). In terms of the dynamics, the
housing durables growth rate is now given by  = 365%, much higher than the observed rate of
24%.
10A by-product of this result is that the redistribution scheme for decentralization must now feature a housing tax
on suburban residents and a housing subsidy to central-city residents. This redistribution scheme is also unlikely in
the real world.
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We also redo comparative statics, obtain the following results:
% 10
10
10
10
10
10  


 −055 −135 −210 −100 −233 −024 −1049 −1088 −415
 145 −233 −362 −174 −401 −043 −202 −210 −074
 035 085 133 063 149 015 679 711 618
The outcomes are mixed. On the positive side, there are no wrong signs contradicting to the theory.
On the negative side, several changes in response to a 10% increase in relative demand in the inner
city (captured by higher ), a 10% decrease in city-wide demand for housing services (captured
by an increase in the luxury good nature of housing ) and a 10% increase in city-wide supply
(captured by higher ) seem too large quantitatively. For example, the more-than-proportional
impacts of a 10% decrease in city-wide demand for housing services on the housing expenditure
share and the housing capital share are unlikely to arise in the real world. Moreover, a 10% increase
in housing durables production technology results in almost 7% increase in the housing expenditure
share and the housing capital share, both very excessive to the reality. Moreover, since housing
durables are mobile across locations, one would expect their cross-location ratios in quantities and
prices not too responsive to locationally uniform changes ( and ). It is not the case under this
model specification: a 10% decrease in city-wide demand for housing services leads to a 21% drop
in the cross-location housing durables ratio, whereas a 10% increase in city-wide supply generates
a 13% increase in the cross-location housing durables ratio.
In summary, the consideration of the minimum structure requirement for housing is most useful
for creating a buﬀer that produces more plausible responses with respect to changes in city-wide
parameters.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have developed a two-sector dynamic general equilibrium model explicitly accounting for loca-
tional choice and several special features of housing. We have shown how housing quantities and
prices respond to changes in goods and housing production technologies, the supply of land as well
as other preference and technology parameters. The model has been calibrated to fit some impor-
tant stylized facts, not only over time, but also across locations within an MSA and across various
MSAs with diﬀerent population gradients. In particular, the quantitative results have conformed
with the four key observations delineated in the introduction, namely, (i) faster growth of housing
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structure/household durables than housing, (ii) faster growth of land prices than housing prices,
(iii) a locationally steeper land rent gradient than the housing price gradient, and (iv) relatively
flatter housing quantity and price gradients in larger cities with flatter population gradients.
We have verified the importance of decomposing the housing structure and the land components
as well as of the spatial discounting of housing services. Moreover, we have established the crucial
role played by nonhomothetic specifications in household preferences and housing production in
generating realistic spatial distributions of various housing related quantities and prices and reason-
able responses to autonomous demand and supply shifts. It is thereby our recommendation that the
above-mentioned features be incorporated into the model framework, in order to properly account
for the aspects of time and space of housing.
Along these lines, perhaps the most important future work is to study the housing sector and
its interplays with the non-housing sector over the business cycle. This may be done by introducing
stochastic shocks to sector-specific technologies ( and  in our model). Another useful venue
of future research is to conduct normative analysis, studying the short-run and long-run eﬀects
of housing-related policy on the performance of the housing sector and the macroeconomy as a
whole. Such policy may include property taxes and provision of public infrastructure that may
aﬀect housing development across diﬀerent locations (such as highways, public transportation, and
public utility).
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Appendix
(A major portion of the appendix is not intended for publication)
A. Comparative-Static Analysis
The key relationships in the baseline one-location setup are summarized as follows:
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Utilizing the hat calculus, we first totally diﬀerentiate the above expressions to obtain:
ˆ = 1
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Next, substituting (41) into (43) yields,
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or, by rearranging terms, we obtain the fundamental equation governing the changes in the housing
quantity (25):
ˆ = ˆ+ ˆ + ˆ + ˆ +  ˆ + ˆ
where the elasticities are given by,
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
´
1
1− − − +
   0
 = −

+ +

+
h
1 + 1(1−)
³
2 − 
´i
³
1−
 +

− +

´
1
1− − − +
 0
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Finally, this latter fundamental equation can then be substituted into (42) to yield the fundamental
equation governing the changes in the housing price (26):
ˆ = 1
(1− ) 
µ
2
− 
¶
ˆ−
∙
1 +
1
(1− ) 

+ 
µ
2
− 
¶¸
ˆ
−  +  ˆ +


µ 
1− 
 − 
 ˆ −

ˆ + ˆ
¶
−
∙
1
1− 
 − 


 +

 + 
¸³
ˆ+ ˆ + ˆ + ˆ +  ˆ + ˆ
´
= ˆ+ ˆ + ˆ + ˆ +  ˆ + ˆ
where the elasticities are given by,
 = 1
(1− ) 
µ
2
− 
¶
−
∙
1
1− 
 − 


 +

 + 
¸
  0
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∙
1
1− 
 − 


 +

 + 
¸
  0 if  small
 = −
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1
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
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
 + 
¸
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 − 

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
 + 
¸
  0
 = 
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1− 
 − 
 −
∙
1
1− 
 − 


 +

 + 
¸
  0
 = −
∙
1 +
1
(1− ) 

+ 
µ
2
− 
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−
∙
1
1− 
 − 


 +

 + 
¸

B. The Dynamic System with One Location
To make the equilibrium properties consistent on average between this one location model and
the multi-location model in the main text, we continue to assume that the population size equals 2
and the land per individual,  , stays the same, which requires:
 =
Z 1
0
 ()
While housing in this one location case is simply  =   ( − )1− , the housing durable evolves
according to ˙ =  (2) −  (with (0) ≥ ). The total labor supply  is assumed to be 1
(i.e., each individual supplies 1/2 unit of labor), so the aggregate capital stock evolves according to
˙ =  1− − 2− 
where  =  +.
29
Thus, the competitive equilibrium can be derived from solving the central planner’s problem as
follows:
max
Z ∞
0

³
  ( − )1− + 
´1− −
subject to: ˙ =  ( −) 1− − 2−  (44)
˙ =  (2) −  (45)
(0)  
The first-order conditions with respect to  and  are:
−1
³
  ( − )1− + 
´1−
= 2 (46)

2
 (2)−1 =  ( −)−1 1− (47)
Euler equations with respect to  and  are given by,
˙ = (+ )−  ( −)−1 1−
˙ = (+ )− (1− ) 1− 
2
 − 
  ( − )1−
  ( − )1− + 
which can be rewritten using the first-order conditions as:
˙
 = (+ )−  ( −)
−1 1− (48)
˙
 = (+ )− (1− )
1− 


 − 
 (2)−1
 ( −)−1 1−
  ( − )1−
  ( − )1− +  (49)
From (48) as well as (44) and (45), we obtain:
 =  − =
µ 
+ 
¶ 1
1−
(50)
 = 2
µ

¶ 1
(51)
 = 1
2
 −  = 
 − 
2
³
1 + 
´ (52)
These can then be used together with (49) to yield,

+
µ

¶-1
(1-) 1-

³ 
+
´ 
1-
-
³ 
+
´ 1
1-
2
³
1+
´ 1-   (-)1-  (-)1- + = + (53)
which solves uniquely , which can then be plugged into (51) and (50) to solve for  and .
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Using (46) and (47), we can write in a recursive manner  as a function of () and  as a
function of ( ):
 =
³
  ( − )1− + 
´µ2

¶1(−1)
≡ ()
 = 2
µ 
2
¶ 1
1−
( −) 1−1−
where the latter yields a unique fixed point  =  ( ). Once we obtain the steady state, we
can then solve by backward shooting of the following system of four diﬀerential equations given by
(33)-(36).
C. Sensitivity Analysis
We consider four sensitivity cases with respect to  (housing durable flow to consumption ratio)
and  (housing-sector capital-output ratio), adjusting one parameter each time while keeping an-
other at its benchmark value. We then consider two more cases, adjusting  (land expansion rate
away from the CBD) above and below its benchmark value.
Benchmark Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6
 05 045 055 05 05 05 05
 225 225 225 20 25 225 225
 01 01 01 01 01 005 015
 14371 13613 15089 14412 14330 14051 14692
 17095 15460 18715 17186 17004 17095 17095
 04321 04136 04433 04625 03997 04321 04321
 08963 08066 09859 07967 09959 08963 08963
10 10402 10402 10403 10402 10403 10538 10274
10 12503 12506 12499 12507 12498 11967 13037
10 09956 09961 09951 09961 09951 09942 09969
10 07952 07951 07953 07951 07954 08293 0764010 06077 06079 06075 06079 06075 06654 0557310 09995 09991 09999 09990 10000 09993 09996
 024 024 024 024 024 024 024
 01641 01508 01769 01493 01783 01641 01641

 31441 30016 32781 31518 31364 32155 30754
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Figure 1. Small Redistributive Measures Needed for Decentralization
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Figure 2. Housing and Land Rent Most Sensitive to Location
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Figure 7. Housing Expenditure Share
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